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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective: Anosognosia, or unawareness, for memory loss has been proposed to underlie cognitive 
functions such as memory and executive function. However, there is an inconsistent association between 
these constructs. Recent studies have shown that compromise ongoing self-monitoring of one’s memory 
associates with anosognosia for memory loss. Yet to date it is unclear which memory monitoring 
mechanisms are impaired in these patients. In this study, we examined the extent to which temporal 
monitoring or orbitofrontal reality filtering (e.g., ability to monitor the temporal relevance of a 
memory) and source monitoring (e.g., the ability to distinguish which memories stem from internal as 
opposed to external sources) are associated with awareness of memory deficits. 
Methods: A total of 35 patients (M=69 years; M=14 years of education) with memory difficulties following 
a stroke were recruited from outpatient clinics. Patients were assessed with measures of self-awareness of 
memory difficulties, cognitive abilities and two experimental paradigms assessing source and temporal 
monitoring. 
Results and conclusion: Results showed that patients unaware of their memory difficulties were more 
likely to externalize the source of their memories. Specifically, those unaware of their deficits were more 
likely to assign an external source to memories that were internally produced (e.g., imagined). No 
differences were observed in relation to temporal monitoring between patients aware and unaware of their 
deficits. This study informs current theoretical models of self-awareness of memory loss. Future studies 
should attempt to replicate these findings and explore different memory monitoring mechanisms in relation 
to anosognosia for memory loss. 
  
Key words: Anosognosia, unawareness, memory, reality filtering, monitoring,  
 
1. Introduction 
Anosognosia for memory loss, or unawareness of memory loss, is a complex construct that 
refers to the lack of awareness of memory deficits due to brain injury or degeneration (Agnew & 
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Morris, 1998; Mograbi & Morris, 2018). Several studies have investigated lack of awareness for 
motor, sensory and cognitive disorders leading to a growing belief that this syndrome is a 
multifaceted phenomenon that can be caused by the disruption of different cognitive mechanisms 
(e.g. Marcel et al., 2014; Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010) and anatomical networks (Moro et al., 
2016; Pacella et al., 2019). Not surprisingly, different mechanisms can underlie anosognosia for 
memory impairment (e.g., Cosentino, 2014; Mograbi & Morris, 2013). Although different 
subtypes of anosognosia for memory impairment may exist (Agnew & Morris, 1998), recent 
studies showed that the ability to track and control consciously certain elements of the ongoing 
memory experience, may be crucial for the emergence of awareness of memory deficits (Chapman 
et al., 2018; Cosentino, Metcalfe, Butterfield, & Stern, 2007; Cosentino et al., 2016). Specifically, 
these studies demonstrated that deficient online monitoring of one’s ongoing memory 
performance, also referred to as local (lower) levels of awareness (Clare, Markova, Roth, & 
Morris, 2011), is associated with compromised global (higher) levels of awareness or  anosognosia 
for memory loss. 
Deficits in monitoring memory performance can be contextualized as deficits in a 
mnemonic comparator as described in the Conscious Awareness Model (CAM) (Agnew & Morris, 
1998; Morris & Mograbi, 2013). This comparator is hypothesized to detect ongoing memory errors 
by comparing them to the expected performance based on previous experiences. It is unclear, 
however, what specific mnemonic monitoring disruptions are critical for the breakdown of 
awareness. In an attempt to elucidate the elements that play a key role in supporting global memory 
awareness, this study examined two specific mnemonic monitoring mechanisms that could lead to 
an impairment of a mnemonic comparator as described in the CAM: a failure of temporal 
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monitoring (Schnider & Ptak, 1999), and a failure of source monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981, 
2000). 
Temporal monitoring or reality filtering refers to the ability to monitor the temporal 
relevance of a memory, that is, its timing in relation to other memories and its relevance to the 
present moment or the ‘now’ (Schnider & Ptak, 1999; Schnider, von Däniken, & Gutbrod, 1996; 
Nahum et al., 2012; Liverani et al., 2015). This monitoring process has been shown to rely on the 
orbitofrontal cortex (see Schnider, 2013 for a revision). Failure in temporal monitoring or reality 
filtering, demonstrated repeatedly in patients with confabulatory phenomena and disorientation, 
has been proposed as the mechanism by which these patients are unable to determine what 
information is relevant to the present moment resulting in a profound confusion of what is currently 
relevant (Cocchini, Lello, McIntosh, & Della Sala, 2014; Dalla Barba & La Corte, 2015; Gilboa 
et al., 2006; Nahum et al., 2012; Schnider, 2008, 2013; Schnider, Ptak, von Daniken, & Remonda, 
2000; Schnider et al., 1996). Within the context of self-awareness of memory performance, the 
ability to know if a memory relates to the past or the present would appear key for patients to learn 
that their memory is not what it used to be. 
Source monitoring or reality monitoring on the other hand, refers to a source attribution 
process by which memories that stem from an internal source can be distinguished from an external 
source (i.e., imagined vs. seen; Johnson, 1991; Johnson & Raye, 1981, 2000). Failures in this 
monitoring ability have been associated with memory and perceptual disturbances in patients with 
mental disorders and acquired brain injury (Brébion et al., 2000; Cocchini et al., 2014; Johnson, 
1991; Radaelli, Benedetti, Cavallaro, Colombo, & Smeraldi, 2013; Turner & Coltheart, 2010). 
Further, within anosognosia for motor deficits, researchers such as Venneri and Shanks (2004) 
hypothesized that deficits in source or reality monitoring can underlie anosognosic patients’ 
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inability to assess the veracity of their beliefs. Other groups (Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Jenkinson, 
Edelstyn, Drakeford, & Ellis, 2009; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010; Saj, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 
2014) have since assessed monitoring deficits through experimental paradigms and showed that 
patients anosognosic for motor deficits had difficulties distinguishing between self-generated 
information (imagined actions) versus externally experienced (seen actions). Similar to patients 
with anosognosia for hemiplegia, patients with anosognosia for memory loss might have 
difficulties discerning the expected (i.e., internal source) outcome for performance from their 
actual performance (i.e. external source), on a given memory task, evidencing a bias toward 
“externalizing” internal sources.  
This study investigated the evidence for the role of two memory monitoring abilities, 
temporal monitoring and source monitoring, in producing anosognosia. We hypothesized that if 
the results supported impairment in temporal monitoring, patients unaware of their memory 
deficits may experience difficulties in becoming aware of their deficits as due to an inability to 
distinguish the accurate temporal relevance of a memory. That is, they have greater difficulties 
identifying temporally relevant items to the now) and suppressing the proactive interference of 
previous items (e.g., filtering out temporally irrelevant items) compared with patients aware of 
their impairment. On the other hand, if results supported a source monitoring deficit, anosognosics 
will show difficulty in monitoring internally vs externally generated memories, and we would 
expect higher error rates when discriminating between these compared to those who are aware of 
the memory deficits.  
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2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Forty-one patients were recruited from stroke outpatient clinics at St. George’s NHS 
hospital, London, U.K. and at Columbia University Medical Center, New York, USA. Patients 
were recruited consecutively at their routine stroke follow up visits. All patients were referred by 
a consultant neurologist as having suffered a stroke. Once consented participants underwent a 
screening for memory impairment, those who showed memory impairment on initial screening 
with a story immediate and delayed recall test of the BCoS Brain Behavior Analysis test 
(Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson, & Riddoch, 2012) and performed below 5th percentile in age 
corrected scores were then enrolled for the full study.  All participants provided full consent and 
procedures were approved by the NHS research ethical board in UK and the Institutional Review 
Board at Columbia University Medical Center in the US. Out of these patients, 4 did not have an 
informant to describe the patient’s performance and anosognosia, and 2 did not have a stroke 
confirmed by their radiological report, resulting in a final sample of 35 patients.  
The 35 patients included in this study were on average 69 (SD = 13) years old, had 14 (SD 
= 3.7) years of education, and 40% (n = 14) were women. Most (71.4%, n = 25) self-identified as 
White American or British, 20% (n = 7) as Black American or British, and 8.6% (n = 3) as South 
Asian. Most patients 94 % (n = 33) were right-handed. All patients had suffered from a stroke, 
with 3 patients having had several strokes ranging from 2 to 3 strokes in total. Mean time since 
first ever stroke was 42 months (SD = 69). Lesion location, as described in radiological and clinical 
reports, is provided in Table 1. Lesions described by radiologists include both the acute clinical 
stroke that prompted clinical evaluation and incidental subclinical lesions. A total of 45 informants 
7 
 
(10 patients had two informants) were on average 48 years old (SD = 17) and had 14 mean years 
of education (SD = 3). 
 
Table 1. Lesion description of 35 patients with memory difficulties following stroke 
Nature 
of lesion 
Unilateral 
Left Hemisphere 
Unilateral Right 
Hemisphere 
Bilateral Total 
Haemorrhagic 1 1 3 5 
Ischemic 15 7 8 30 
Total 16 8 11 35 
Number of patients with lesions encompassing left, right or both (bilateral) hemispheres. For further description of 
please refer to supplementary Table S5.  
 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Cognition and anosognosia 
With regard to cognition, patients were assessed with measures of long term memory (The 
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test – 2, RBMT – 2 ) (Wilson, Cockburn, & Baddeley, 2003) 
and short term verbal and visuospatial memory (Randolph, 2012; Wechsler, 1997). Language, 
executive functions and attention were assessed with the BCoS Brain Behavior Analysis test 
(Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson, & Riddoch, 2012). 
Everyday memory functioning awareness (anosognosia) was measured through the Visual 
Analogue Scale for memory impairment (VATAmem; Chapman et al., 2019). The VATAmem 
consists of 15 questions exploring everyday memory and 4 check questions to control reliability 
of participants’ responses. The 15 memory-related items explore two different dimensions of 
memory: prospective and retrospective memory. Prospective memory questions refer to those 
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activities in which an individual needs to remember an intention for a future action (e.g., 
remembering to make a phone call later). Retrospective items examine memory for activities in 
which an individual needs to recall past learned information (e.g., remembering that they have 
already told a person a story). All items are balanced across items referring to self versus 
environmentally cued activities; that is, those in which an individual relies on internal cues to 
remember information (e.g., remembering appointments without the help of a calendar) versus 
remembering information when cued by something in the environment (e.g., remembering to give 
something to someone when you see them). All items are also balanced across short versus long 
term memory (i.e., memory for information that was just learned versus information that had been 
learned before). Each item is illustrated by a vignette and participants are asked to rate their current 
difficulty in performing each task by means of a 4-point visual-analogue scale (0= “no problem”; 
3= “problem”; see Chapman et al., 2019 for example). The final overall score could range from 0 
to 45.   
The VATAmem provides a continuous discrepancy score between informant and 
participant that can range from -45 (complete disagreement where the patient is underconfident of 
their abilities) to +45 (complete disagreement where the patient is overconfident or unaware of 
their difficulties). A discrepancy score of zero indicates a complete agreement between patient and 
informant, and therefore perfect awareness. A discrepancy score over +10.5 suggests that patients 
show a significant lack of awareness and this performance is considered to represent anosognosia 
(Chapman et al., 2019).     
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2.2.2. Monitoring measures 
2.2.2.1.Temporal monitoring task 
Temporal monitoring or reality filtering of memories was explored through a Continuous 
Recognition Test (CRT). Specifically, a version from Schnider and Ptak (1999) test, adapted by 
Cocchini et al. (2014), was used in this study. This test measures the ability to distinguish between 
information obtained at different moments in time, specifically which information is relevant to 
the ‘now’. Four runs were displayed to the participant with different intervals between the runs 
varying from zero to 30 minutes see Figure 1). The first and second runs were presented 
immediately after each other, the third run after a five minute delay and the fourth run was 
presented 30 minutes after the third run. In every run, 80 stimuli, composed of coloured Snodgrass 
pictures (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004) were presented. The same stimuli were used for all runs, 
however, five randomly selected items randomly recurred six times in each run resulting in a 
possible total of 30 hits (i.e., I have seen this item before in this run) and 50 true negatives (i.e., I 
have not seen this item before in this run).  
Figure 1. Depiction of the CRT four runs.  
 
The participant must identify the item (here indicated with a *) that has already been presented within that run. 
10 
 
 
Patients were explicitly instructed to focus on the ongoing run only and to ignore stimuli 
presented in previous runs. Following, they were presented with the pictures one at a time and 
instructed to identify those that were recurrent in the ongoing run (Figure 1). All runs were 
preceded by four practice items with different pictures. The practice session was repeated until 
instruction comprehension was ensured. According to Schnider and Ptak (1999), if patients exhibit 
a temporal monitoring deficit, they will experience incremental false alarms across runs as they 
will experience difficulties discerning which item they previously saw in other runs from the ones 
that are currently relevant. This difficulty is interpreted as a failure to monitor the temporal 
relevance of newly learned information also known as a failure in reality filtering (Schnider & 
Ptak, 1999).  
2.2.2.2. Source of memory task 
An adapted and modified version of the Henkel et al. (1998) source monitoring task was 
used to measure the ability to distinguish between internally and externally generated memories 
(Cocchini et al., 2014). In the encoding phase (Figure 2A), patients are presented with 30 object 
words of which half were accompanied by a Snodgrass picture of the object (Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart, 1980). When the picture was not shown beneath the word, patients were explicitly 
instructed to create an image of the object in their head. Furthermore, patients were encouraged to 
focus on the object characteristics and their appearance by estimating how long it would take to 
draw the perceived or imagined object (Henkel et al., 1998). Snodgrass pictures used for this test 
were not used in the previous temporal monitoring task. 
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Figure 2. Depiction of the Source of memory task during the encoding (A) and delayed retrieval (B) phases. 
 
A. Encoding phase: patients see or imagine (word only stimuli) common objects. B. Retrieval phase: Patients choose: 
i) Yes-seen (if they saw the object); ii) Yes-imagined (if they imagined the object); or iii) No-new if they neither saw 
nor imagined the object (i.e., new stimuli). 
 
The encoding phase was preceded by a practice run of four words (two with and two 
without object pictures). After a 15-minute delay, a surprise recognition test was conducted in 
which patients were presented with 45 object words (Figure 2B). Of these words, 15 were new, 15 
had been presented in the encoding phase with a picture and 15 had been presented in the encoding 
phase without a picture. Patients were then asked to indicate for each word whether it was a seen, 
imagined or new picture. Written instructions were provided during the recognition test listing 
these three options. The stimuli were presented in pseudorandom order.  
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2.2.2.3. Outcome measures 
For both the temporal and the source of memory monitoring measures, we calculated the 
total Hit and False Alarm rates. To further examine how patients responded to the items, Pr 
(discrimination accuracy) and Br (response bias) were calculated following the two factor theory 
of memory which is recommended when the number of targets and distractors are uneven and to 
account for ceiling or floor effects (Brazzelli, Cocchini, Della Sala, & Spinnler, 1994; Corwin, 
1994; Jenkinson et al., 2009). Pr represents how well the patient can distinguish between targets 
and distractors. Br represents the tendency with which the patient responds (i.e., more conservative 
or more liberal). These were calculated as follows: 
Pr = (total hits + 0.5 / total targets + 1) - (total false alarms + 0.5 / total distractors 
+1) 
Br = (total false alarms + .05 / total distractors + 1) / (1 – Pr)  
Three additional scores were calculated for the source monitoring data following Jenkinson et al. 
(2009). A Source Proportion (SP) score was developed to capture patients’ ability to monitor if the 
information learned was imagined (internal source) or seen (external source). To examine if there 
were different biases in source categories, an Externalization Bias (EB) and an Internalization Bias 
(IB) were also derived. These scores were calculated as follows: 
SP = total correct source assignation / total hits 
EB = ∑ erroneous external source assignation 
IB = ∑ erroneous internal source assignation  
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2.2.3. Statistical analyses 
Analyses were conducted in SPSS v.25.0. Descriptive analyses were conducted to examine 
the distribution of demographics and cognitive abilities in the sample. Fisher’s exact test was 
conducted to examine differences in cognitive impairment across awareness status (e.g., aware vs. 
unaware). As all patients had impaired memory abilities, the severity of the memory impairment 
was compared using the Mantel-Haenszel test of trend. Two-way mixed repeated measures non 
parametric models were used to examine outcome measures (hits, False alarms, Pr, and Br) from 
the temporal monitoring task as assumptions for repeated measures mixed ANOVAs were not met 
(Noguchi, Gel, Brunner, & Konietschke, 2012). For these analyses, the R-package ‘nparLD’ using 
ANOVA-type statistics (ATS) was used (Brunner, Domhof, & Langer, 2002; Noguchi et al., 
2012). Four separate models were run to consider hits, false alarms, Pr and Br as dependent 
repeated measures. Independent variables in each of these models included Group (aware versus 
unaware status), time (indicator of each of the 4 runs/trials of the CRT task) and an interaction 
between group and time. With regards to the outcome measures (Pr, Br, and source proportion) of 
the source of memory monitoring task, independent sample t tests and Mann Whitney U tests were 
conducted. Further, as parametric assumptions were violated, Spearman correlational analyses 
were conducted to examine if reductions in awareness were linearly associated with increased 
errors in source monitoring abilities. Finally, supplementary analyses were conducted in a 
subsample of cases matched on memory impairment scores in an attempt to examine possible bias 
from group differences. All supplementary analyses were non-parametric due to the limited sample 
size.   
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3. Results 
3.1. Cognitive measures and anosognosia 
All patients had impaired memory performance (i.e., BCoS episodic memory story 
immediate and delayed). Patients’ performance on the RBMT-2 showed that 37% (n = 13) of the 
patients were classified as having severe memory problems, 37% (n = 13) as having moderate 
memory impairment, and 26% (n = 9) as having mild memory impairment.  
According to the VATAmem cutoffs (see Chapman et al., 2019), 13 (37%) patients were 
deemed as unaware of their memory deficits, 1 patient showed severe unawareness (3%), 5 (14%) 
moderate and 7 (20%) mild unawareness. Impairment in cognitive measures was examined as a 
function of awareness to explore whether some cognitive abilities were selectively impaired, or 
more severely impaired, in those considered unaware versus those considered aware by the 
VATAmem. Results showed that anosognosic patients were more likely to be more severely 
impaired in memory abilities. No other differences were observed (see Table 2). 
With regard to demographics and clinical outcomes in relation to anosognosia, no 
associations were observed in relation to age (r = 0.20, p = 0.10; d = 0.41) or education (r = 0.26, 
p = 0.14, d = 0.54). However, males tended to be marginally less aware of their memory deficits 
(M = 7.40, SD = 9.98) than females (M = - 2.00, SD = 17.02) (t = - 2.03, p = 0.051; d = 0.67). 
There was no significant difference between aware and unaware with regard to their lesion location 
(χ2 (2) = 2.38, p = 0.30). 
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Table 2. Frequency of impaired performance in patients unaware and aware of their memory difficulties. 
 
Cognitive performance 
impairment 
Aware 
n/N (%) 
Unaware 
n/N (%) 
Sig. Two 
tailed 
Effect size 
Odds Ratio 
Long term memory – RBMT 
    
Mild impairment 7/22 (32%) 2/13 (15%)  
0.047* 
2.07 
Moderate impairment 10/22 (45%) 3/13 (23%) 1.97 
Severe impairment  5/22 (23%) 8/13 (62%) 0.37 
Short term memory– Verbal  2/22 (9%) 0/13 (0%) 0.39 2.36+ 
Short term memory – Visuospatial  5/17 (30%) 2/11 (18%) 0.42 1.62 
Executive function 7/22 (32%) 7/13 (54%) 0.18 0.59 
Attention 7/21 (33%) 6/11 (55%) 0.22 0.61 
Language 9/21 (43%) 2/13 (15%) 0.14 2.79 
*The Mantel-Haenszel test of trend showed a statistical linear association between unawareness and severity of 
memory impairment (χ2 (1) = 3.94, p = .047). Significant results are bolded. +Odd ratios were calculated 
correcting the frequency of 0 impaired patients to 0.5 to enable and reduce bias of the ratio. 
 
 
3.2. Temporal monitoring task 
Performance on the temporal monitoring task was analyzed in relation to awareness. Total 
hits and false alarms, for aware and unaware cases, can be observed in Figure 3. A non-parametric 
equivalent of a mixed repeated ANOVA was conducted to examine differences between awareness 
groups and time (i.e., runs). As reported in Table 3, we found a significant effect of time (p = 
0.002), but no significant differences in overall hit rates between aware (mean rank = 71.25) and 
unaware patients (mean rank = 64.06; p = 0.47), nor a significant interaction effect between 
awareness and time (p = 0.23). With regard to false alarms rates, a significant effect of time (p 
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<.001) was observed and a significant difference between groups, with unaware patients (mean 
rank = 82.26) showing increased false alarms in relation to aware patients (mean rank = 59.98; p 
= 0.04). There was no interaction between awareness and time (p = 0.96). 
An absolute difference was also observed between patient groups in overall discrimination 
accuracy (Pr), with unaware patients having lower Pr (mean rank = 56.71) than aware patients Pr 
(mean rank = 75.80, p = 0.08; See Table 3), but this difference was not significant. Further, 
although a significant effect of time was observed (p < .001), there was no interaction between 
awareness and time (p = 0.91). Finally, with regard to response bias (Br) although unaware patients 
showed increased Br (mean rank = 80.81) compared to aware patients (mean rank = 60.88) this 
difference was not significant (p = 0.07). While there was a significant effect of time (p = 0.02) 
there was no significant interaction between group and time (p = 0.90) (see Figure 3). 
Supplementary analyses were conducted in order to explore possible bias from group 
differences in long term memory performance. These analyses were run in a subsample of cases 
(n = 22) matched by age, education, gender and memory performance (see Supplementary section 
Table S2). The pattern of results remained the same across all analyses (see Supplementary 
analyses section). 
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Figure 3. Results of CRT task across aware and unaware participants.  
 
From left top Hits, false alarms across aware and unaware groups. From left bottom to Response criterion (Br) and 
recognition accuracy (Pr). 
 
Table 3. Results from non-parametric repeated mixed models of outcome measures from the temporal 
monitoring task (hits, false alarm, source proportion (Pr) and response bias (Br). 
Temporal 
monitoring  
task 
Group Effect 
(aware/unaware) 
 
Time effect (runs) 
 Interaction  
(awareness x 
time) 
 
 F p Effect 
size 
F p Effect 
size 
F p Effect 
size 
HIT rates 0.51 0.47 0.12 5.12 0.002 0.55 1.23 0.29 0.37 
FA rates 4.06 0.04 0.34 14.03 <0.001 1.01 0.09 0.96 0.09 
Pr 3.05 0.08 0.30 13.77 <0.001 0.90 0.12 0.91 0.11 
Br 3.22 0.07 0.30 3.74 0.02 0.46 0.15 0.90 0.14 
Significant results are bolded. Effect sizes can be interpreted similarly to Cohen’s d. 
18 
 
 
3.3. Source of memory task 
Results of the source of memory task were also analyzed in relation to awareness and are 
illustrated in Table 4 and figure 4. Overall hits were not significantly different between those 
unaware and aware of their deficits (t (33) = 0.90, p = 0.38). However, unaware patients made 
significantly more false alarms than the aware patients (U = 82.0, p = 0.04). Analysis of response 
bias (Br) revealed that those unaware of their memory deficit did not differ from those aware in 
their response criterion (t (33) = -1.25, p = 0.22). Finally, with regard to discrimination accuracy 
(Pr), unaware patients showed worse discrimination accuracy than aware patients (t (33) = 2.70, p 
= 0.01) (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Results of outcome measures from the temporal monitoring task (hits, false alarm, source 
proportion (Pr) and response bias (Br). 
Source monitoring 
task 
 
Group Effect (aware/unaware) 
 
Mean (SD)/Mdn. (IQR)^ 
Aware 
Mean (SD)/Mdn. (IQR)^ 
Unaware 
Sig.  
Two sided p 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d/r^ 
HIT rates 0.63 (0.26) 0.56 (0.21) 0.38 0.30 
FA rates 0.07 (0.13)^ 0.13 (0.63)^ 0.03 0.36^ 
Pr 0.52 (0.25) 0.23 (0.39) 0.01 0.89 
Br  0.14 (0.12) 0.19 (0.12) 0.21 0.42 
Source Proportion 0.84 (0.14) 0.74 (0.18) 0.07 0.84 
^ Non parametric Mann Whitney U test conducted, median and interquartile ranges (IQR) reported as descriptives and 
r as effect size. Significant results (p<0.05) bolded. 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Figure 4. Results of source monitoring task across aware and unaware groups.  
 
From left to right mean and standard deviations of Hit Rate (HR) False Alarms (FA), discrimination accuracy (Pr), 
response bias (Br) and Source Proportion (SP) in patients aware versus unaware of their memory deficits on the 
Source of monitoring task. 
* Significant differences (p <0.05). 
 
With regard to patients ability to monitor the source of the information (i.e., internal versus 
external information), there were no significant group differences in discerning internal versus 
external sources (t (33) = 1.87, p = 0.07) (see Table 4). Spearman correlations were then conducted 
to examine a potential association between the direction of a source bias (i.e., internalization or 
externalization bias) in relation to awareness. Results showed a significant correlation between 
unawareness and externalization bias (r = 0.44, p = 0.01; d = 0.98) but not internalization (r = 0.14, 
p = 0.42; d = 0.28).   
We further explored the nature of the externalization bias and its relationship with 
awareness. In particular, we queried whether this bias was more likely to be triggered by imagined 
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information (i.e., ‘imagined targets reported as seen’) or by unfamiliar information (i.e., ‘new 
targets reported as seen’). Results showed that unawareness was significantly correlated (r = 0.44, 
p = 0.01; d = 0.98) with externalization of imagined targets but not unfamiliar targets (r = 0.28; p 
= 0.11; d = 0.58). 
As in the temporal monitoring task, we ran additional analyses on subsamples matching 
aware and unaware groups according to age, education, gender and memory performance (see 
Supplementary Table S1). Results did not differ from those of the original sample. 
 
4. Discussion 
This study’s main goal was to assess, contextualized within the proposal of the CAM model 
(Agnew & Morris, 1998), the type of mnemonic monitoring failures observed in patients unaware 
of their memory difficulties. We examined two main monitoring processes, temporal monitoring 
and source monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Schnider, 2008). Findings from this study support 
an association between specific mnemonic monitoring failures and anosognosia for memory loss. 
Thirty-four percent of patients were unaware of their memory difficulties. With regard to 
demographics, no association was found between factors such as age or education and 
unawareness of memory loss. Interestingly, males tended to overestimate their abilities, although 
this difference was marginally significant; supplementary analyses revealed no differences in the 
main findings when subjects were matched in gender. Overall, patients unaware of their memory 
difficulties were more likely to have impaired global cognition and memory than those aware of 
their difficulties. Some other studies have found similar trends (Levine et al., 1991; Vocat et al., 
2010), suggesting that anosognosia may be linked to a general cognitive impairment that prevents 
21 
 
patients from becoming aware of a deficit, and therefore may be an epiphenomenon of other 
disorders (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Cocchini, Beschin, & Della Sala, 2012; Davies, Davies, & 
Coltheart, 2005; Levine, 1990). In the case of memory deficits, it has been posited that patients 
with poor memory abilities are less able to remember their mistakes and thus less likely to become 
(Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009) or remain (Cocchini, Beschin, & Della Sala, 2002) aware. 
However, it is not always the case that anosognosia relates to more severe global cognitive and/or 
memory impairment (e.g., Derouesne et al., 1999; Migliorelli et al., 1995; Reed, Jagust, & Coulter, 
1993), and it has been hypothesized that specific impairments in self-evaluative or memory 
monitoring processes may be the key mechanism by which awareness becomes impaired (see 
Cosentino, 2014). Indeed, our findings support the idea that anosognosia arises as the result of 
impairments to specific mnemonic monitoring failures rather than memory loss or cognitive 
impairment more globally. 
Examination of temporal monitoring revealed no significant difference in the ability to 
monitor the temporal relevance of stimuli as a function of anosognosia. That is the pattern of false 
alarms over the course of the test trials was similar, with both groups experiencing more difficulty 
in Run 2 than Run 1 as expected (Figure 3), and false alarms plateauing by run 3.  By run 4, false 
alarms decreased in the unaware group. As described in the methods section, patients with 
temporal monitoring deficits should show incremental difficulties across runs as they cannot rely 
on the temporal characteristics of the information learned (Schnider, 2008). This pattern of results 
thus appears not to support a temporal monitoring deterioration as a contributor to anosognosia, as 
errors should increase over time as it become more difficult to discern which stimuli are temporally 
relevant. Further, awareness groups showed no differences in response criterion.  
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It should be noted, however, that as compared to the aware group, the unaware group 
evidenced an overall higher number of false alarms than aware patients across all trials, potentially 
reflecting a deficit in more general cognitive abilities such as inhibition. Impairments in inhibition 
are well known to produce difficulties in suppressing proactive interference from recently learned 
information and thus could explain these results (Anderson, 2003; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 
2000; Anderson & Levy, 2007; Storm & White, 2010). Moreover, the decreased false alarms in 
Run 4 among unaware individuals may also reflect a more basic memory impairment (i.e., 
information from previous runs is forgotten and thus loses its interfering valence). The overall 
increased false alarms in the anosognosic group could be indicative of inhibitory deficits that could 
suggest executive dysfunction in these patients. Although aware and unaware participants on this 
study groups were not significantly different on the BCoS measure of executive function, our study 
did not include further executive function measures that assessed abstraction or inhibitory abilities 
which could have explained differences between aware and unaware participants. If an executive 
dysfunction was present in these patients this could lead to what is referred to as executive 
anosognosia, a type of anosognosia defined in the CAM model in which monitoring impairments 
reflect executive dysfunction (Agnew & Morris, 1998). Indeed, previous studies have shown the 
importance of the recruitment of monitoring abilities underlying executive function in the 
production of false memories (e.g., Ciaramelli, Ghetti Frattarrelli & Ladavas, 2006). Regions 
known to be crucial for executive function such as the ventromedial frontal cortex have been 
shown to play an important role in monitoring the accuracy of memories, how memories are 
updated and reconstructed (Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002; Moscovitch & 
Winocur, 2002; Rugg et al., 2002; Gilboa et al., 2009) Moreover, monitoring abilities of relevant 
and accurate memories are the foundation of autobiographical memory which represents memories 
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specific to the self and is the foundation for self-awareness (Morris & Mograbi, 2013). Future 
studies should apply carefully selected executive function measures in patients with variable levels 
of awareness to further characterize if executive dysfunction can underlie disordered awareness of 
memory loss. 
With regard to source monitoring, results from this study support an association between 
anosognosia for memory loss and the ability to distinguish between internally versus externally 
generated information. In theory, patients with anosognosia for memory loss might have 
difficulties discerning the expected outcome for performance (i.e., internal source) from their 
actual performance (i.e. external source) on a memory task, evidencing a bias toward 
“externalizing” internally generated information. The pattern of results observed in the current 
study supports this possibility, and corroborates impairments in source monitoring that have been 
observed in patients suffering from anosognosia of motor deficits (see Jenkinson et al., 2009; Saj 
et al., 2014; Venneri & Shanks, 2004). Specifically, on the current source monitoring task, aware 
and unaware patients did not differ in total hits (i.e., recognizing a word that was learned), but 
anosognosic patients made more errors in identifying the course of the word (i.e., knowing whether 
it was seen or imagined). Moreover, these patients misidentified internal stimuli as external (i.e., 
externalization bias) with higher frequency than aware patients, similar to that shown by Jenkinson 
et al. (2009).  
It has been suggested that in the context of psychiatric disorders, external misattributions 
serve to protect the ego by avoiding negative connotations associated with the self (Langdon, 
Corner, McLaren, Ward, & Coltheart, 2006). However, in such a scenario, one would expect a 
similar degree of ‘externalization’ for both imagined and new information; on the contrary, the 
externalization bias in the current study was mainly triggered by imagined targets. From a different 
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perspective, Garrison, Bond, Gibbard, Johnson, and Simons (2016) suggested that individuals may 
use a perceptual threshold to determine if a memory stems from an internal or external source (see 
also Bentall & Slade, 1985). In line with such a threshold theory, memories with lower perceptual 
richness would be identified as external whereas internally sourced memories would have higher 
perceptual richness. This approach would suggest that anosognosia in part reflects a deficiency in 
experiencing the perceptual richness that is necessary to attribute memories to an internal source 
which could be partly mediated by the degree of memory impairment in patients. Future studies 
may investigate the nature of this bias in patients with anosognosia as it may allow examination 
of both cognitive and motivational accounts of anosognosia for memory loss.  
This study has some limitations that should be considered when interpreting results. The 
relatively small sample and the stroke onset variability could have influenced results of this study 
by limiting our power to detect more subtle differences between aware and unaware patients. 
Future studies should examine these mechanisms with carefully selected groups at various time 
points after stroke. Further, more statistical analyses were conducted for the source monitoring 
than for temporal monitoring assessments without statistical adjustment. Secondly, patients with 
severe aphasia were excluded from this study, potentially biasing our results. Third, time of stroke 
onset was variable across participants which may have affected their current state of awareness 
and thus influence the results of this study. Future studies should examine these mechanisms with 
carefully selected groups at various time points after stroke. Fourth, although we did not find any 
significant differences with regard to stroke lesions in this study, a more comprehensive 
examination of anatomical correlates could have provided interesting results. Indeed, Pacella et al. 
(2019) recently examined anatomical correlates of anosognosia for motor deficits in stroke patients 
through experimental voxel symptom mapping techniques such as VLSM (Pacella et al., 2019). 
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Their results suggested that anosognosia for motor deficits could be explained as a “tripartite 
disconnection syndrome” which can arise from impaired connections or damage to three main 
systems (i.e., premotor loop, limbic system and ventral attentional network). These results 
highlight the need for more refined techniques when examining anatomical correlates for 
anosognosia. Future research should implement these lesion mapping techniques in addition to 
monitoring mechanisms in patients with anosognosia for memory loss after stroke to further 
characterize these potential underlying mechanisms of anosognosia for memory loss. Moreover, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether the anosognosics’ tendency to attribute stimuli 
internally generated to external sources may also be part of a more profound personality 
mechanism aiming to ‘project’ on external stimuli (or other persons) aspects of their own condition 
in addition to the cognitive monitoring failure..  
To conclude, results from this study showed that patients with anosognosia for memory 
loss have impaired source or reality monitoring. Further, this impairment seems to be driven by an 
externalization bias by which internal sources are misattributed to external sources. In contrast, we 
found no support for a temporal monitoring deficit in patients unaware of their memory deficits. 
As discussed above, monitoring deficits can be contextualized within the Conscious Awareness 
Model (CAM) as specific to the mnemonic monitoring comparator. Results from this study suggest 
that deficits in this mnemonic monitoring comparator are not widespread to all types of memory 
monitoring (see also Bouzerda-Wahlen et al 2015), and that source monitoring may uniquely 
contribute to unawareness of memory loss. Future studies should examine this possible 
contribution in other etiologies of memory loss such as Alzheimer’s disease. Further, as 
highlighted in the discussion more careful examination of cognition, specifically executive 
functions, can also help discern how these mechanisms can give rise to anosognosia for memory 
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loss and if they truly are a unique contributing factor to anosognosia for memory loss. Further 
monitoring mechanisms should be examined in relation to anosognosia to fully understand the 
extent to which deficits in the mnemonic comparator are unique to source monitoring.     
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Supplementary analyses 
Due to significant differences found across aware and unaware patient long-term memory, 
supplementary analyses were conducted to explore if results would remain in a subsample of 
participants matched on age, education and long-term memory performance. Propensity score 
matching led to a sample of 10 unaware patients and 12 aware patients. Neither demographics nor 
cognitive abilities including long term memory were significantly different across the groups (see 
Supplementary Table S1 and Table S2). 
With regard to the temporal monitoring, results largely remained and no significant 
interaction between awareness status and time were observed with regard to temporal monitoring 
outcomes (see Supplementary Table S3). With regard to source monitoring outcomes, as in the 
larger sample, no differences were observed between aware and unaware (see Supplementary 
Table S4). Results showed a significant correlation between unawareness and externalization bias 
(r = .48, p = .02; d = 1.09) but not internalization (r = .15, p = .52; d = 0.30). 
 
Supplementary Table S1. Demographics profiles of a sub-group of aware and unaware patients 
matched on demographic variables and memory impairment. 
 
Cognitive profile of matched 
cases 
Unaware 
(n=10) 
Aware 
(n=12) 
p 
Demographics    
Age 68.00 (14.35) 64.83 (10.16) .55 
Education 14.10 (3.21) 14.91 (3.48) .76 
Sex (female) 3/10 5/12 .45 
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Supplementary Table S2. Performance on cognitive tasks by matched sub-groups. 
 
Cognitive performance impairment 
Aware 
n/N (%) 
Unaware 
n/N (%) 
Sig. Two 
tailed 
Long term memory – RBMT 
   
Mild impairment 3/12 (25%) 2/10 (20%)  
0.37 Moderate impairment 6/12 (50%) 3/10 (30%) 
Severe impairment  3/12 (25%) 5/10 (50%) 
Short term memory– Verbal  0/12 (0%) 0/10 (0%) - 
Short term memory – Visuospatial  2/7 (30%) 0/8 (0%) 0.20 
Executive function 5/12 (42%) 4/10 (40%) 0.64 
Attention 3/12 (25%) 4/10 (40%) 0.32 
Language 6/12 (50%) 2/10 (20%) 0.16 
 
 
Supplementary Table S3. Performance on Temporal Monitoring task in demographically and 
cognitively matched subgroup of patients aware and unaware of their memory difficulties.  
 
  
Temporal 
monitoring task on 
matched cases 
Group Effect 
(aware/unaware) 
Time effect (runs) Interaction  
(awareness x time) 
 F p F p F p 
HIT rates 1.43 0.23 2.54 0.06 1.51 0.21 
FA rates 0.36 0.55 15.07 <0.001 0.34 0.79 
Pr 0.53 0.47 9.94 <0.001 0.22 0.83 
Br 0.06 0.80 5.27 0.002 0.16 0.89 
34 
 
Supplementary Table S4. Performance on Source of memory task task in demographically and 
cognitively matched subgroup of patients aware and unaware of their memory difficulties.  
Source monitoring on 
matched cases 
Unaware 
(n=10) 
Aware 
(n=12) 
 
 Mean rank (IQR) Mean rank (IQR) p 
Pr 9.55 (13.75) 13.12 (9.13) 0.20 
Br 12.45 (9.50) 10.71 (13.25) 0.54 
Source Proportion 9.65 (13.38) 13.04 (11.00) 0.23 
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Supplementary Table S5. Description of patients’ stroke lesion. 
 
 
Patient N. Lesion description 
1 Left parietal lobe infarct 
2 Infarction involving cuneous of the right occipital lobe and isthmus of the cingulate gyrus.  
3 Right thalamus infarct extending into the posterior limb of the right internal capsule 
4 Right frontal lobe, anterior left temporal anterior left frontal lobe infarcts 
5 Left basal ganglia infarct 
6 Right cerebellum lobe infarct 
7 Left cerebellum infarct 
8 Left basal ganglia infarct extending to the corona radiata 
9 Right posterior cerebral artery territory infarct 
10 Mid brain, pons, superior vermis and right cerebellum; Left frontal, parietal and temporal lobe infarcts 
11 Left putamen infarct 
12 Basilar territory bilateral pontine infarct  
13 Left cerebellar infarct 
14 Posterior left frontal lobe and left parietal lobe infarct 
15 Left frontal lobe infarct involving the caudate head with compression of the frontal horn of the left lateral 
ventricle 
16 Aneurysm, subarachnoid hemorrhage 
17 Aneurysm, subarachnoid hemorrhage 
18 Left frontal lobe infarct 
19 Right occipital lobe infarct, small old infarct in bilateral cerebellum and bilateral basal ganglia and 
thalamus 
20 Right corpus callosum, bilateral basal ganglion, inferior cerebellum and left pons infarcts 
21 Left middle cerebral branch infarction affecting the motor strip 
22 Small chronic infarcts within the bilateral medial thalami on the right extending into the middle cerebral 
peduncle (bilateral thalamic and midbrain infarcts) 
23 Aneurysm (right middle cerebral artery) subarachnoid hemorrhage  
24 Right posterior corona radiata; mild cerebral volume loss and microvascular ischemic changes 
25 Right midbrain, temporal and right cerebellar infarct 
26 Left middle cerebral artery territory infarct 
27 Left pontine infarct 
28 Caudate nucleus infarct involving the left corona radiate and external capsule 
29 Right middle cerebral artery territory involving the right corona radiata, frontal operculum, anterior 
insula, basal ganglia. Bilateral cerebellum 
30 Left medial temporal lobe, left occipital and left thalamus infarct 
31 Intracerebral bilateral hemorrhage 
32 Right thalamic intracerebral infarct 
33 Left frontal and left parietal lobes infarct including the left precentral sulcus, and a small focus in the head 
of the left caudate nucleus. Few foci of cortical ischemia in the lateral and anterior left frontal lobe.   
34 Right frontal and parietal lobes infarct. Restricted diffusion in the underlying white matter. Old infarct in 
the left frontal operculum 
35 Left posterior frontal and temporoparietal infarct 
